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Composition and Growth of Soviet and
United States Freight Transjortation
A Railroad Economy
From the point of view of its transportation and the allocation.
of freight and passenger traffic among the several transportation
agencies, the Soviet economy is and always has a railroad economy.
Despite the emphasis placed upon the development of other forms
of transportation, railroads, which in 1919 had handled 61 per cent
of freight traffic, were built up until by 1940 they handled 87 per cent.
The economy of the United States has never been so greatly dominated
by rail transport as the Soviet economy has during and since the second
war, and the trends in this country have been opposite of those
in the Soviet Union. Hence Soviet traffic in recent years can be quite
well understood through a study of the railroads and the greater
part of the subsequent chapters will, therefore, be devoted to Soviet
rail operations.
It is impossible for an American familiar with transportation in his
own country to study Soviet transportation andobtain the greatest
meaning from his work without making contint1al comparisons with
conditions in the United States which are better known to him and
which can serve as background for analysis of the available Soviet
data. Moreover, a primary purpose of this is to examine and
compare with the U.S. the growth of Soviet transport, to consider the
validity of the Soviet growth, and to secure an und4rstanding of whether
and how that growth has been possible from the capital inputs
which Soviet policy has devoted to the transport sector of the economy.
Occasional reference is made to European but the Soviet
railroads have in particular sought to emulate practice as more
appropriate to their large tonnages and great distances and, except
for Germany, a similar abundance of and traffic statistics
is not available among the larger European countries.
For someone who is not a student of transportation, it is necessary to
provide a clear picture of American conditions if are to be
indulged in, for they have not been understood even within the
transportation industries. Hence many between American
and Soviet data have been, to a certain extent, Our ap-
proach, therefore, requires some development of 'data for the United
States after we have brought together available traffic data for the
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Soviet Union. Only a comparison of aggregate traffic in the two coun-
tries will provide some understanding of the comparative supply and
growth of transportation, and this will become all the more apparent
as we proceed. Air transportation will, however, be neglected for both
the Soviet Union and the United States. The emphasis here is almost
entirely upon freight transportation which is of primary interest for
what it may disclose about economic growth. In neither country has
cargo transportation by air reached a sufficient level to have any
significant effect upon the aggregate of freight transportation.' We
shall have occasion to devote a few pages to rail passenger transporta-
tion, however, because it affects rail transportation of freight. While
civil air transport has been important for urgent and official passenger
travel, the volume of traffic remains minor by comparison with that in
the United States, and railroads remain the principal means of
passenger transport on intercity routes.2
A discussion of forms of Soviet transport other than rail in this
first chapter will permit their contributions, strengths, and weaknesses
to be understood and will provide a background for the presentation
of aggregate freight traffic data by all forms of transportation. In later
chapters the discussion will focus primarily on rail traffic and opera-
tions. It will also be helpful to keep in mind the organizational pattern
of the transport system, especially since it often affects the form and
content of the statistical materials and sometimes their quality as well.
Separate ministries exist for rail, inland river, and maritime transport,
and the administration of these forms of transport remains centralized.
The People's Commissariat for Water Transport was, in 1939, divided
into the River Fleet and Maritime Fleet Commissariats, subsequently
renamed ministries. Much water transport was organized under yet
another ministry, although considerable motor transport has always
1Inthe United States, goods transportation by air, including the mails, represents
approximately 0.02 per cent of the freight ton-miles.In 1958 Soviet air passenger
traffic(including international) was roughly one-sixth of the U.S. domestic air
passenger volume. Although no absolute data have been published .on air cargo
in the USSR, its growth appears to have been given much less emphasis than the
passenger services.See ICAO Bulletin (International Civil Aviation Organization),
June 1961, p. 86.
2Since1956 Soviet civil air passenger service has begun a very rapid growth,
1.ising newly introduced aircraft of advanced design.For recent traffic estimates, see
Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies, U.S. Congress, Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, Washington, 1959, Part I, p. 196.For details on routes and
aircraft, see George Kish, "Soviet Air Transport," The Geographical Review, July
1958, pp. and Hans Heymann, Jr., "The Soviet Role in International Civil
Aviation," Journal of Air Law and Commerce, summer 1958, pp. 265-280. A recent
appraisal by Stuart Tipton, "The Soviet Challenge in Civil Aviation," was pub-
lished in The General Electric Defense Quarterly, April-June 1961, pp. 26 if.
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been controlled by nontransport ministries. Control of motor transport
has, however, been decentralized along with industry in general. For
operating purposes the railroad system is regionalized under railroad
administrations, generally referred to as railroads. These do not, of
course, have the autonomy of an American railroad corporation, but
correspond more nearly with the regions or divisions of an American
railroad. Since these railroad administrations do not correspond with
the regions to which administration of the majority of economic
functions was confided in the decentralization move, some complexity
has no doubt been introduced into the relationships between railroad
administrations and the administrations responsible for industrial
functions. Finally it may be noted that pipeline transportation, quite
logically,is administered as a part of the petroleum production
organization.
Water Transport
All types of transportation have undergone some development in the
Soviet Union. Extensive use had been made of the inland waterways,
and maritime traffic had been developed on the Caspian, Baltic, and
Black Seas in the period before the revolution. As in other countries,
the waterways had provided the principal means of bulk transportation
prior to the development of a comprehensive rail network. The Soviet
Union, however, has not been favored by nature with many navigable
watercourses and the extensive improvement of certain channels has not
overcome the fact that the location of the waterway system does not
correspond, with some exceptions, to the more important traffic flows
generated by resource location and population concentration. Hence,
although second only to the railroads in its contribution to traffic,
water transportation has experienced only a modest development and
one obviously disappointing to the planners3 and to such officials as
Kaganovich and the Minister of Transportation, whose policies have,
over the years, sought a more significant relief for railways in waterway
development.4 The complaint repeated over and over again in
3Bycomparison with railways, water-carrier operations—particularly inriver
transport—usually call for a smaller input of critical materials, particularly iron and
steel, to achieve a given ton-mile output.On the other hand, the difficulty of
obtaining return loads because of the character of traffic flows is a serious impedi-
ment in the Soviet case and, indeed, often limits water-carrier development in
transportation systems elsewhere.
4Bothinland and maritime water transport again failed to reach the levels
planned for them in 1950.Compare Five Year Plan for the Rehabilitation and
Development of the National Economy of the USSR, 1946-1950, London, 1946,
pp. 48 if, with 1940 and 1950 data in series C-41 and C-49 in Appendix C.The
shortfall in maritime traffic was the most serious.More recent growth has been of
some consequence but has afforded no significant relief to railroads.
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speeches of Party and other officials and in the press is of inefficiency
and lack of initiative and energy on the part of the water carriers and
their administrators. Characteristic of such statements is the follow-
ing:5 "Sabotage by enemies of the people and laxity and weak dis-
cipline among some of the workers in river and sea transport have
caused these sectors to lag.Every measure has been taken by the
Government to eliminate this backwardness."
Neither the conditions nor the causes thereof appear to be correctly
portrayed by any such statements and, in the light of the attention
focused on the prospects of water transport as a relief to the railroads,
it is well to pay some attention to the possibilities of a more revealing
description.
Soviet water transport falls into three departments: maritime traffic
in foreign trade, maritime traffic in domestic trade, and traffic on
rivers, canals, and other inland waterways.° The first of these will
be disregarded here as it is not a portion of Soviet internal transpor-
tation, although the readily available data appear in the statistical
appendix. The domestic phases of water transport have developed
under unfavorable natural conditions. Nevertheless, it also appears
that technology in river and domestic maritime trades has lagged
behind the best practices elsewhere and that laxity in the handling
of cargoes and the lack of solicitation of traffic by the water transport
authorities have aggravated the natural disadvantages.7 At the same
time, the shortage of materials and components connecting stages of
production appears to have put a premium upon rapidity of movement.
The inland waterways in the areas of older development comprise
particularly the Volga and its tributaries, which before the war were
reported to account for 45 per cent of the river traffic; the White
Sea-Baltic and Moscow-Volga Canals; and the Dnieper and the Don
with their tributaries. The Volga, in conjunction with the canals
mentioned, provides an inland waterway which extends without inter-
ruption from the Caspian to the White Sea, while the postwar Volga-
Don Canal extends navigation via the Don into the Sea of Azov and
thence into the Black Sea. The route is, however, extraordinarily
roundabout, as is frequently true of rivers in relatively flat country.
5S.S. Baizak, V. F. Vasyutin, and Ya. G. Feigin, Economic Geography of the
USSR (translated from the Russian), New York, 1949, p. 476.
6Statisticaldata for all three departments are presented in Appendix C, series
C41 through C-49.Total freight traffic on inland waterways under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry and other organizations is not given here since these data are not
available after 1932.For maritime traffic, Appendix B should be consulted.
7Thefailure to relate water to rail rates is also, no doubt, of importance and is
commented upon in Chapter 2.
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The Dnieper and the Don have failed to develop any very significant
traffic. Unlike the Volga, they do not reach the important industrial
regions of the Northwest. Neither do they effectively tap the Donbas,
the principal resources of which are remote from the navigable rivers.
No effective water connection exists between the Donbas and the
Moscow Basin or the Urals in view of the extreme circuity of the
Volga route.8 In short, these rivers are not well located as regards
the basic mineral resources upon which the industrial economy is
founded. The Volga, however, is in part a useful water route for the
movement of oil from the Caucasus and grain from its tributary areas
and for the southbound movement of lumber for transshipment into
the Donbas and Caucasus. The less intensive development of railways
in the territory served by the lower Volga no doubt contributes to
the importance of the river and results, in part, from the relative
efficiency of the water route. But the Volga route into the Moscow
and Leningrad areas is far too indirect to prove attractive even for
low-grade bulk traffic. Hence local movements are characteristic and
through traffic the exception. Indeed the joint water-rail petroleum
movement northbound has been superseded by all-rail movement to
a certain degree, while a short-haul local distribution of petroleum
from the "second Baku," the new midcontinent producing field, has
come into existence.0
The northern rivers of European Russia, notably the Northern
Dvina and the Pechora, are vital to the development of the area in
the absence of railways. They are devoted largely to the rafting of
timber to vessels of the maritime fleet operating in the White and
Barents Seas and, in the case of the Pechora, to the movement of
coal from Vorkuta.Similarly,the Siberianrivers accommodate
lumber traffic.As none of these rivers were tapped
bytherailroad system from the south withintherangeof
their navigability until recently, they served primarily to feed the
Northern Sea Route, and hence were distinctly limited in their
8Inconsequence, heavy capital expenditures have been made to develop principal
rail routes between these areas in order to provide accommodation particularly
for the traffic in coal, ores, and other bulk commodities which are often amenable
to water transportation where the waterways are reasonably well adapted to the
resource pattern.
9Considerablematerial has been brought together by Holland Hunter in his
Soviet Transportation Policy, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, Chapter 8.He is certainly
correct in offering the heavy costs of transshipment as a major reason for the failure
of joint movements to develop to a greater degree.The "second Baku" lies in
the Kuibyshev-Perm area.On this development, see Edmund Stevens,
World's No. 2 Oil Producer—the U.S.S.R.,' Fortune, June 1961, pp. 132 if.
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economic usefulness by the extreme shortness and uncertainty of the
navigation season along that route.Nevertheless, the rivers of the
northwest and the Siberian and Central Asian rivers are said to have
accounted for 15.3 and 12.2 per cent, respectively, of the 1937 river
traffic.lO The extension of the northern rail route to the Ob' pre-
sumably enables the latter stream to serve as a feeder for the rail
system and also to distribute upstream (southward) from railhead
at Salekhard. In various parts of the country, rivers—large and small—
are employed for the local transportation of agricultural produce,
lumber, sand, and other commodities to railhead, but in the aggregate
these short-distance movements create no great volume of traffic.11
Someof this traffic, carried in small boats, may escape the statistics.
Not only are the Soviet inland waterways poorly located with respect
to resources long since prospected, but no waterways of importance
exist in the areas of newer industrial development; nor are there any
which can carry much east-west traffic, which has become of growing
importance. Moreover, the disadvantage of circuity is supplemented by
the greater disadvantages of seasonality and of unreliability of channel
depths. The rivers of European Russia are navigable six to eight
months of the year and are closed by ice during the remainder of the
year. Those of Arctic Russia are open from five to seven months, but
certain of them are accessible from the sea only during a much shorter
period and then only by organized convoys traveling the Northern
Sea Route in the company of icebreakers, the supply of which has not
been adequate. In most parts of the country the navigation season
is not only short, but also uncertain, which is an impediment to long-
distance movements toward the latter part of the season since they
run the risk of being closed out by ice conditions. Similarly, there is
a tendency, when pressure to ship is heavy, for a build-up of the river
traffic to be slow in the spring, the railroads being used as a precaution
against late opening, which might result in traffic being tied up at
the ports of transfer.
Not much information has come to hand on the equipment and the
character of operations even on the principal streams. No considerable
investigation has been made of this subject. It appears, however, that
there has been a lag in the technological development of river opera-
tions and that the European rather than the American pattern is
10Baizak,et al., Economic Geography, p. 476.
11Theabsence of a suitable branch-line development over the newer portions of
the rail network and the absence of a developed highway network leave many
collective farms dependent upon small streams for their access to railway lines.
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followed.12 Moreover, the equipping of ports has lagged. Rail con-
nections to piers have not been provided in some instances and the
supply of cranes and particularly of heavy-lift cranes has been made-
quate.13 All principal types of handling equipment known in the
United Statesare,however, employedto some extent.Hence
the economy of movement obtained from large integrated tows does
not appear to be secured; neither is expeditious transfer between
land and water transport universally provided. In the United States,
traffic on the inland rivers has been, in recent years, the fastest growing
part of the freight business. The activity of aggressive enterprises,
whose success depends upon an ability to divert traffic from the land
routes and which therefore do their utmost to develop rate and
service incentives, to influence industrial location, and to solicit traffic,
has certainly been important in stimulating this development. By
way of contrast, Soviet waterway operators appear to be passive and
not given to the intensive efforts necessary to overcome their natural
handicaps. It is also noteworthy that an important and growing part
of American inland water transport is by private carrier, i.e., operated
by industrial enterprises. The proportion of powered inland water
traffic operated in the Soviet Union by organizations other than the
Ministry is small and appears to be declining. As has often occurred
elsewhere, large expenditures to improve navigation appear to have
yielded small dividends in comparison with what was expected. For
in 1954 the inland waterway traffic stood at little more than double the
1913 figure although railway traffic had multiplied thirteen times.
The lack of a system such as that of the Great Lakes, which is further
12Americanriver transportation has relied on tows built up ahead of the tow-
boat, firmly lashed to it, and therefore pushed as a single unit.European opera-
tions, on the other hand, have used towed barges strung out behind the towboat,
as is common in our coastal waters.The American system on the rivers permits
tows that are very large (often exceeding 10,000 tons on the better channels and
running as high as 35,000 tons), yet highly maneuverable.Integration of the tow
to achieve better underwater form has reduced resistance and permitted a con-
siderable increase in speed. A trend toward self-propelled boats is reported in
the USSR, but it appears that the horsepower of Soviet river craft is generally less
than in the U.S.See "Inland Waterway Officials Say Russia Plans Diversification
of Transportation Facilities," Traffic World, October 22, 1960, P. 53.
13Fora discussion of the astonishing lack of capacity to unload and turn ships
at Archangel, see C. B. A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War,
London, 1955, pp. 253 if.The recent mission of U.S. inland waterway officials was,
however, well impressed with the coordination between rail and water and
referred to new and expanded river-railterminals being "built everywhere."
Moreover containers have evidently come into substantial use, since the Ministry
of the River Fleet is said to own 200,000 of them.(See Traffic World, October 22,
1960, p. 53.)Joint rail-water shipments have, indeed, grown and now stand con-
siderably above the prewar level.Yet they represent only 10 per cent of the
originated river tonnage.
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commented upon in Chapter 3, makes the Soviet inland waterway
traffic compare poorly in relative volume and in economic significance
with that of the United States.Actually, it is not far behind our
inland waterway traffic if the Great Lakes are excluded, but does not
appear to be enjoying the rapid expansion of our river traffic in the
past several years.
Although there has been a growth in joint shipments between rail
and water, it has been quite modest by comparison with the growth of
all-rail traffic. The reporting of such. shipments is, however, evidently
far from complete since it records only such shipments as move under
through billing. These data are as follows for directly reported joint









1928 0.50 0.50 0.80 2.0
1952 1.40 0.60 2.00 2.8
1939 . 2.63 2.19 4.82 6.6
1940 8.01 2.91 5.92 7.2
1945 0.40 1.07 1.47 4.1
1949 2.00 3.31 5.32 7.3
1950 3.29 4.49 7.78 9.1
SouRcE: V. V. Zvonkov,Vzaimo.sviaz'. otdelnykhvidovtransportaIosnovy
organizatsil smeshannykh perevozok [The Interrelation of Different Types of Trans-
port and Principles for Organizing Joint Shipments], Moscow, 1953, p. 5.
In comparison with the 834.3 million tons originated on the railroads
in 1950, these joint shipments are small indeed. Soviet data indicate
that the costs of river transportation (excluding the costs of channel
maintenance) are not notably below rail costs. Thus, for 1956, they
show a river cost of 3.41 kopeks per equated ton-kilometer compared
with 3.7 kopeks by rail. The closeness of these data results in part,
of course, from the relative circuity of many of the river routes.'4
Domestic maritime traffic is also severely handicapped. The Soviet
Union has no connected coastline but has instead limited ranges for
maritime coastwise trade in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, and White Sea
and on the Pacific seaboard. Weather and ice conditions prevent
large-scale use of the Northern Sea Route despite extensive work to
improve Arctic navigation. All routes connecting these several coastal
areas require highly circuitous movements. Hence the heaviest coastal
traffic is on relatively short hauls within the Black Sea and the Sea
14Transporti sviaz' SSSR [Transportation and Communications in the USSR],
Moscow, 1957, p. 24.
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of Azov. Operations on the Caspian also come within the jurisdiction
of the Maritime Fleet, but are more akin to lake transportation than
to the usual run of coastwise operations. Except for movements for
the iron and steel industry and the petroleum trade in the Black,
Azov, and Caspian Seas and for the lumber and coal trades in the
White Sea, heavy commodity movements are not readily accommodated
to maritime transport.
It will be observed from series C-43 and C-49 in Appendix C that
there has been a tendency toward a shorter average haul, both in
inland waterway and in the coastwise trades, since the early 1930's.
Indeed, the length of haul upon inland waterways appears to decline
markedly as early as 1929, while that in the coastwise trade breaks
after 1933. By comparison with the lengthening average haul by rail,
that of sea transport is of somewhat equivalent length in recent years,
while the inland waterways show a short average haul, indicating the
predominance of relatively local traffic. The increasing importance of
the short-haul Baltic trade, in line with territorial acquisition, must
have had its effect upon the length of haul in maritime traffic, but can
hardly fully explain this sharp shift.Notwithstanding the heavy
expenditures for the improvement of inland waterways, no evidence
appears of the development of large-scale, long-distance traffic over
these routes, although the development of predominantly short-haul
movements on the northern and Siberian rivers may have some slight
influence in holding this datum in the vicinity of 500 kilometers in
recent years.It is probable, also, that a part of the tonnage growth
and of the shortening of haul results from the inclusion in the data
of a larger proportion of the short-haul traffic in recent years. The
absence of comprehensive operating statistics, the paucity even of
traffic information, and the numerous shifts in coverage and reporting
methods all make doubtful the practicability of a detailed study of
Soviet water transport. As inland waterways and coastwise operations
together account for less than 10 per cent of the total ton-kilometrage
in recent years, intensive efforts to augment the data appear inappro-
priate to this study.
Truck Transport
Freight transportation by motor truck was virtually nonexistent before
1930.It then grew rapidly until 1936 and thereafter maintained a
steady level until the eve of war. The prewar level was attained early in
1947, and by 1953 ton-kilometrage had nearly quadrupled, reportedly
• somewhat exceeding the traffic in the coastwise trade and reaching
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approximately one-half that of the inland waterways.15 The statistics
are, however, highly unreliable, particularly those purporting to give
ton-kilometers, since estimates of length of haul, especially with less
truckload movements, tend to be less reliable than estimates of weight
on the vehicles. Purporting to come from the reports by drivers to
the Ministry and surveys at check points of a rather small sample
blown up to represent the total population, these compilations un-
doubtedly exaggerate the operations which they are intended to
cover.16 On the other hand, they are probably incomplete, as they
appear likely to exclude much trucking which is performed on behalf
of collective farms and of industrial ministries in vehicles controlled
by those organizations and which is neither reported by drivers nor
covered by the check-point surveys. Moreover, the growth of reported
traffic has been exaggerated by its increase in coverage.
Enough is apparent from the available data, however, to warrant
the complete exclusion of truck transportation from a compilation of
Soviet intercity traffic data, just as interplant and local switching
movements are excluded from the rail data. For it is apparent that
virtually no line-haul transportation by truck exists.17Reference
to series C-55 will disclose that the average reported haul, probably
overstated, has varied over the last fifteen years between 10.4 and
13.2 kilometers. This is primarily traffic of the local cartage variety,
performed largely in urban and industrial areas and seldom extending
beyond the limits of commercial zones.It is of the type excluded
from the intercity transportation data of the United States and of
many other countries and of the type about which virtually nothing
is known statistically in the United States.18 It embraces local pick-up
and delivery and local distribution services hitherto largely performed
by horse dray, but in part substitutes for rail switching moves within
terminal areas and over plant railroad systems not a part of the
national system. It also embraces rural feeder functions into railheads
See series C-53 for the estimated volume of this traffic.
16 Soviet methods for surveying motor traffic are similar in principle to those
employed by the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. No detailed investigation of com-
parative methods has, however, been attempted. A description of Soviet methods
is given by E. P. Lebedev, Transportnaia statistika [Transportation Statistics],
Moscow, 1953, pp. 75 if, 87 if.
17 While the 1946.50 Plan called for the organization of "interdistrict" transport
of heavy loads by road and also for an increase of 11,500 kilometers in the network
of improved roads, there is nothing in available data to suggest more than occa-
sional truck loads in intercity movement.
18 The absence of data on other than intercity operations in the U.S. is discussed
in Harold Barger, The Transportation Industries: 1889-1946, New York, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1951, pp. 221 f.
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and rural-to-rural movements which are excluded from available
United States data. Truck transportation performs the feeder and
distribution role anticipated for it in the United States in the early
1920's.'°
The limited system of highways and the nearly complete lack of
improved highways constitute a serious bar to the development of
truck transport.20 The shortage of petroleum has also stood in the
way of its development in the past. As will be observed in Chapter 3,
Soviet policy is now to encourage the use of trucks for very short
hauls, but to provide sharp incentives for employment of railroads for
hauls beyond twenty kilometers. Probably truck transport is more
expensive relative to railway in the Soviet Union than in the United
States and it should be borne in mind that even in the United States
truck transportation is relatively economical only for quite short hauls.
From the point of view of resource allocation, the development of
long-haul truck transport in the Soviet Union would be an error in
other than exceptional circumstances. Yet it should play a role in the
opening up of new territory where the volume of traffic early in
prospect, while insufficient to justify railroad construction, nevertheless
requires overland movement. Extension of the improved highway net
will, no doubt, also give rise to a modest intercity truck movement of
goods requiring more than usual dispatch, a condition likely to be
encountered if a shift toward greater proportions of an increasing
variety of consumer goods occurs in the aggregate Soviet output.
Petroleum Pipelines
The pipeline has played an astonishingly minor role in Soviet trans-
portation.Series C-50 through C-52 summarize these results. Not
only is the aggregate of minor significance, but the postwar advance
over 1940 was, until the last five years, modest, as was the growth
in the 1930-40 decade. Comparatively little attention is paid to pipe.
lines in the Soviet transportation literature, undoubtedly because of
l9To include it in a tabulation for comparison with the United States would
slightly inflate the Soviet performance.If, however, value weights were em-
ployed, along the lines tested by James Blackman in "Measuring the Volume of
Transport in the USSR" (processed, Johns Hopkins Operations Research Office
Technical Memorandum 126, Baltimore, 1951), using estimated ton-mile cost of
transportation, a serious inflation would be introduced, since Soviet truck trans-
portation appears to be remarkably expensive in comparison with rail and other
forms.However, the data on this point are scant and would tend to confirm that
the truck transport is of the nature of local cartage in which unit operating costs
would be relatively high.
20In1956 there were 1,506,000 kilometers of roads, of which 214,500 were hard-
surfaced.Only 47,100 kilometers, however, were cement or black-top surface.See
Transport i wiaz', p. 201.
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their slight significance up to recent times. Increasing oji production
and use, however, are now affording opportunity for further develop.
ment of the pipeline net, and it is clear from recent discussions and
from the Seven Year Plan that considerable pipeline construction is
contemplated.
The scant development of pipelines no doubt derives from the
small-scale oil production and, more particularly, from its scattered
distribution. Economy, compared with rail or water transport, can
only be secured when a regular flow can be concentrated into relatively
large-diameter pipe. In the United States twenty-four- to thirty-inch-
diameter pipe with a capacity for crude of between 220,000 and
300,000 barrels per day appears necessary to attain the economy of the
large tanker in coastwise service or of the large integrated tow on
the principal rivers. Smaller pipe in the eight- to ten-inch range will
achieve an economy approximately that of the railroad, but the flow
even in such lines involves a heavy concentration of delivery. Where,
therefore, petroleum or petroleum products must be spread Out over
a vast territory for consumption at low rates at numerous points,
economical pipeline transportation becomes impossible to arrange
beyond certain break bulk points from which other methods of
transportation will have to be employed for distribution. The absence
of a large automobile population and the scant farm use of petroleum
in the Soviet Union necessitate retail rather than wholesale movements
over long distances. In the first stage from the refinery, moreover,
maritime and river transport can afford bulk movement to numerous
points of transfer to the rail system. It appears that, with increasing
petroleum production and an increased density of demand, further
pipeline development is anticipated and that this method is coming
into favor because of the economy with which it uses materials,
particularly steel. up to the present, however, pipelines have played
an exceedingly minor role in Soviet affairs and the railroads have
been a correspondingly large factor in total petroleum transportation.
Yet, as will appear in Chapterpetroleumand petroleum products
accounted in 1958 for only 6.9 per cent of rail tons originated, suggest-
ing that petroleum is a much smaller element in Soviet transportation
as a whole than is true in the United States.21
21 The Sixth Five Year Plan contemplated virtual replacement of rail transport
of petroleum by a considerable expansion of the pipeline system(see Gudok
[Whistle], March 2, 1956).Yet it is apparently anticipated for 1965 that in spite
of marked growth in pipeline traffic, railroad ton-kilometers of petroleum and
petroleum.product traffic will rise from 11.8 per Cent(in 1958)to 13.6 per cent
of total railroad ton-kilometers (see series C-8)
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Aggregate Intercity Transportation
Ton-kilometers alone can safely be aggregated to provide a measure
of total transportation and, as this datum combines distance with
tonnage hauled, it is the most useful traffic statistic for most purposes.22
Tonnage originated runs the risk of duplication because the same ton
may be reported as originated two or more times when it is trans-
ferred from one form of transportation to others. No adequate data
have been discovered on transfers between forms of transport, although
it is known that considerable pipeline and water traffic has a subsequent
or prior haul by another form of transport. Transfers between the
inland and maritime fleets will even tend to inflate the tonnage
originated by water carriers.Soviet transportation is, however, per-
formed so largely by rail that the data on tonnage originated by rail-
roads and its breakdown by commodity groups (discussed in Chapter 3)
can hardly fail to be representative of the entire transportation picture
and cannot understate the tonnage originated for the transportation
system as a whole by more than from 6 to 10 per cent in most years.23
Rail tonnage originated is,therefore, useful for comparison with
production data. Accordingly, although tons originated for each type
of transport are shown in the Appendix C, the data relied upon here
are metric ton-kilometers which are shown below for selected years
for the several types of intercity transport and the total (Table 1,
Part A, and Chart 1). These data have also been converted into short
ton-miles (Table 1, Part B).
22 ton-milesavoid a double count.Thus a ton moved 500 miles by rail
and 200 miles by truck would give two tons originated, but only 700 ton-miles, i.e.,
total length of haul times the one actual ton involved.
23Althoughrail tonnage originated in the U.S. and the USSR can be compared,
tonnage originated data do not exist for U.S. transportation by truck and those for
water carriers are of uncertain reliability.While tons handled by truck can be
estimated from length of haul for regulated carriers(roughly one-third of the
total), no allowance can be made for double counting as a result of multiline
truck hauls.Pipeline tons originated include heavy duplication, since the bulk of
such traffic moves again by water or truck.The same is true of some rail and
truck traffic which receives a prior or subsequent rail haul. The growing piggyback
service will produce a double count under piggyback plans I and V, the same
ton being shown as a rail ton originated and included in truck tons handled despite
continuous movement in a highway semitrailer. Average hauls have been increasing
in both countries, but as far as itis possible to make an intelligent guess, the
lengthening of hauls is not more rapid in one country than in the other.Thus
the representativeness of ton-miles should not have been affected.
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TABLE 1
SovIET FREIGHT TRAFFIC, SELECTED YEARS,1913-60










1913 65.7 26.2 15.1 0.3 107.3 61.2
1920 14.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1925/26 68.9 12.9 n.a. 0.4 n.a. n.
1928 98.4 15.9 6.2 0.7 116.2 80.4
1930 133.9 22.9 10.0 2.2 169.0 79.2
1932 169.3 25.1 13.9 2.9 211.2 80.2
1936 323.4 81.1 16.7 5.6 574.8 86.3
1937 354.8 83.0 17.0 3.6 408.4 86.9
1938 370.5 32.0 18.8 3.6 424.9 87.2
1939 391.7 34.6 23.0 3.7 453.0 86.5
1940 415.0 85.8 21.6 3.8 476.2 87.1
1945 314.0 18.3 10.1 2.7 345.1 91.0
1946 335.0 19.9 12.4 8.6 370.9 90.3
1947 350.5 24.4 14.7 n.a. 39L6e 89.0
1948 446.0 30.9 16.6 n.a. 497.5e 89.6
1949 523.8 37.2 19.6 n.a. 584.6e 89.6
1950 602.3 45.5 21.2 4.9 678.9 89.4
1951 677.3 51.0 22.9 5.5 756.7 89.5
1952 741.3 57.1 25.8 6.4 830.6 89.2
1953 798.0 58.6 28.0 7.6 892.2 89.4
1954 856.8 61.7 28.2 10.2 956.9 89.5
1955 970.9 66.6 29.7 14.7 1,081.9 89.7
1956 1,079.1 69.7 31.6 20.5 1,200.9 89.9
1957 1,212.8 75.5 n.a. 26.6 1,346.9f 90.0
1958 1,302.0 84.5 n.a. 33.8 1,452.3f 89.6
1959 1,429.5 92.5 n.a. 41.6 1,595.6f 89.6
1960 1,504.3 98.4 n.a. 51.2 1,685.9f 89.2
PART B BILLION SHORT
1913 45.0 17.9 10.3 0.2 73.5
1920 9.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1925/26 47.2 8.8 n.a. 0.3 n.a.
1928 64.0 10.9 4.2 0.5 79.6
1930 91.7 15.7 6.9 1.5 115.8
1932 116.0 17.2 9.5 2.0 144.7
1936 221.5 21.3 11.4 2.5 256.7
1937 243.0 22.6 11.6 2.5 279.7
1938 253.8 21.9 12.9 2.5 291.1
1939 268.4 23.7 15.8 2.5 810.3
1940 284.5 24.3 14.8 2.6 326.2
1945 215.1 12.5 6.9 1.8 236.4
1946 229.5 13.6 8.5 2.5 254.1
1947 240.1 16.7 10.1 2.7h 269.6
1948 305.5 21.2 11.4 2.7h 340.8
1949 358.8 25.5 13.4 2.71' 400.4
1950 412.6 31.2 14.5 3.4 461.6
1951 464.0 34.9 15.7 3.8 518.3
1952 508.8 39.1 17.7 4.4 569.0
1953 546.6 40.1 19.2 5.2 611.1
1954 586.9 42.3 19.3 7.0 655.5
1955 665.1 45.6 20.3 10.1 741.1
1956 739.2 47.7 21.6 14.0 822.6
1957 830.8 51.7 21.9h 18.2 922.6
1958 891.8 57.9 21.91' 25.2 994.8
1959 979.2 63.4 21.91i 28.5 1,093.0
1960 1,080.4 67.4 21.91' 35.1 1,154.8
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NOTES TO TABLE 1
a Taken from series C-i, Appendix C.Data are tariff metric ton-kilometers in-
cluding company material hauled in trains.These do not reflect
the physical work performed by the railroads as closely as operating ton-kilometers.
They do more closely approximate the useful "product," as they come close to
representing the service required.in distribution within the confines of the existing
railroad plant.See the discussion in Chapter 2.
b Taken from series C-4 1.Extensive recourse has been had to estimations based
on percentage relationships. (see notes to series C-41).For 1956-59series C-41,
Co1.2,times ratio of col. 1 to col. 2 for 1955.
c Taken from series C-47.Data cover domestic maritime traffic carried in Soviet
bottoms.Participation of foreign flags in Soviet domestic traffic was of some
significance for a brief period during the early 1930's, but declined after 1936 and
disappeared in 1940. Tons originated by foreign flag tonnage exceeded 15 per cent
of the total for several years during that period. No ton-kilometers are available,
however, for the foreign-flag tonnage.Hence the data for Soviet bottoms only can
be employed in this compilation.Data from series C-47 are largely estimated
and the notes should be consulted for explanation.See also Appendix B for a
general discussion of the problems of estimating Soviet maritime traffic.For
1955-56, derived from the ratio of 1954 estimate to petty cabotage in Table B-10.
d Taken from series C-SO.
e Obtained by assuming pipeline traffic was 4 billion metric ton-kilometers in
these years.
f Obtained by arbitrarily assuming that domestic maritime traffic was 32 billion
metric ton-kilometers in these years.
gConvertedfrom ton-kilometers at 0.685 ton-miles per metric ton-kilometer.
h Assumed to enable a total to be estimated.
NOTE: Changes in concept, of which some have come to our attention and others
may not have, deprive these series of complete homogeneity. The rail tariff ton-
kilometers, in particular, have been subjected to a change in the postwar period
that inflates them somewhat by comparison with the earlier data.This change is
discussed in Chapter 2.
























































The probable accuracy of the rail series will be discussed at some
length in Chapter 2.Suffice it to say that it is believed to overstate
actual performance somewhat. While Table 1 probably reasonably
reflects the relative movement of traffic by various types o transport
from year to year, it should be borne in mind that the data in all
likelihood err on the high side. Much more is known about the nature
and causes of error in the rail series than in the others. Not enough
is known, however, to permit any conclusion on whether the series for
one type of transport is more seriously overstated than those for others.
Only a qualitative comment is possible on the direction of error.
It will be observed that all intercity freight transportation quad-
rupled between 1928 and 1940, that the prewar level was attained in
1948, and that by 1954 it had been doubled. Since 1945 a remarkable
stability has prevailed in the relationship of rail to other forms of
transportation. Even the sharp growth in pipeline volume after 1953
has not greatly disturbed this relationship.
It should be noted that some of the postwar growth in traffic can be
traced to expansion of Soviet territory. For years up to 1940, the
data in Table 1 are given for the interwar territory; for 1940 on, for
the postwar territory. The acquired territories brought about an
increase of approximately 7 per cent in railway mileage but they prob-
ably had a traffic density somewhat lower than that of the Soviet
system in the interwar territory.
Transportation in the United States
Although rail transportation is representative of Soviet transportation
today, the same is not true in the United States. Comparisons of the
two countries using freight traffic growth as representative of economic
growth must be made from aggregates of intercity transportation by
all forms of transport (except air which is too negligible for inclusion).
A first step is, therefore, to develop the aggregate ton-mile output
in the United States in a fashion as nearly comparable with the Soviet
coverage as possible. This is difficult because, for some forms of trans
portation, our statistics are hardly in a better state than those of the
Soviet Union and may easily contain biases of as great a magnitude
as those that are believed to characterize the Soviet data; nor is the
bias likely to be always in a single direction.24 Moreover, certain of
the data have been shifting in coverage over the period we would like
to compare and we are unable here to go into all of the qualifications
24Onlythe data on railroads can properly be referred to as statistics.
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which surround the estimates for every form of transport except
rail, although we shall call attention to them and cite available
discussions.Because of the infirmities of estimates for years before
1939, emphasis will be placed upon the period from 1940 to the present,
although some much less reliable estimates will be employed for
selected years before 1940 because of the great interest of con-
temporaneous developments in the Soviet Union.
From Table 2 (and Chart 2) on intercity freight traffic in the United
States, it appears that, whereas in the 1920's railroads were accustomed
to handle well over 60 per cent of the total volume, their share declined
rapidly during the 1980's until America's entry into the second war.
TABLE 2








1890 84.0 19.2 16.6 119.8 70.1
1920 456.2 78.0 59.0 7.0 600.2 76.0
1926 490.8 93.0 158.0 5.0 19.0 765.8 64.1
1928 479.1 86.0 163.0 8.0 26.0 762.1 62.9
1930 423.2 78.0 160.0 12.0 33.0 706.2 59.9
1932 258.0 28.0 1310 15.0 34.0 466.0 55.4
1936 375.3 86.0 192.0 28.0 40.2 721.5 52.0
1937 398.6 103.0 219.0 35.0 45.0 800.6 49.8
1938 320.2 60.0 202.0 40.0 42.5 664.7 48.2
1939 370.2 96.2 234.7 52.8 55.6 809.5 45.7
1940 411,8 118.1 243.4 62.0 59.3 894.6 46.0
1945 736.2 142.7 117.2 66.6 126.5 1,189.2 61.9
1946 642.7 124.0 229.7 81.7 95.1 1,173.2 54.7
1947 706.7 146.7 206.7 101.7 105.2 1,267.0 55.8
1948 688.7 161.8 210.5 115.5 119.6 1,296.1 53.1
1949 567.3 139.4 214.3 124.9 114.9 1,160.8 48.9
1950 628.5 163.3 233.0 170.2 129.2 1,324.2 47.5
1951 686.4 182.2 251.1 182.5 152.1 1,454.3 47.2
1952 651.4 168.4 248.1 184.1 157.5 1,409.5 46.2
1953 641.8 202.4 264.4 217.2 169.9 1,495.7 42.9
1954 577.5 173.7 270.2 214.6 179.2 1,415.2 40.8
1955 654.8 216.5 278.7 226.2 203.2 1,579.4 41.5
1956 670.2 220.0 274.4 253.8 230.0 1,648.4 40.6
1957 649.4 231.8 268.4 244.9f 222.7 1,617.2 40.0
1958 574.8 189.0 n.a. 255.5 211.3 1,500.6g 38.3
1959 604.0 196.6 n.a. 288.5 227.0 1,586.lg 38.1
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NOThS TO TABLE 2
a Revenue ton-miles of Class I, II, and III line-haul railways, electric railways,
express and mail, plus nonrevenue ton-miles of Class I steam railroads. Nonrevenue
ton-miles of other railroads are not available but are negligible.For 1889, from
Barger, Transportation Industries, p. 184, adjusted as for 1940.For 1920, 1926,
1928, 1930, 1932, and 1936-88, derived from tons carried one mile by Class I, II,
and III railroads as those compared in 1940 with the 1940 datum shown here. Tons
carried one mile are from Statistics of Railways in the United States, Interstate
Commerce Commission, Washington, 1940, Table 155.For 1939.52, from Intercity
Ton Miles, 1939-1952, I.C.C. Statement No. 544, File No. 10-D-7.For 1958-59,
revenue ton-miles (from Transport Economics, October 1955, p. 5; 70th Annual
Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, 1957, p. 43;73rd
Annual Report of the i.C.C., Washington, 1959, p. 11; 74th Annual Report of the
I.C.C., Washington, 1961, p. 10; and Intercity Ton Miles, 1939-1959, I.C.C.State-
ment No. 6103, File No. 10-D.7) adjusted to the broader concept for 1953 by the
relationship which prevailed in 1952, for 1954 and 1955 by the addition of non-
revenue ton-miles reported in 70th Annual Report of the I.C.C., p. 43 (source note
1). and for 1956-59 by the relationship which prevailed in 1955.
b Includes the Great Lakes and the intercoastal waterways.For 1889, 1920, 1926,
1928, 1930, 1932, and 1936-88, estimates from Barger, Transportation Industries,
Table H-I, p. 254.Expansion of the coverage of Corps of Engineers data em-
ployed for estimation account for lack of homogeneity between earlier and later
years. For 1939-52, from Intercity Ton Miles, 1939-1952, Table 2. The data include
certain international operations conducted in the United States inland waters.For
1953-59, from Transport Economics, October 1955, p. 5; 70th Annual Report of the
I.C.C., p. 43; 73rd Annual Report of the I.C.C., p. 11; and Intercity Ton Miles,
1939.1959.
C For 1889, 1920, 1926, 1928, 1930, 1932, and 1936-38, from Barger, Transportation
Industries, p. 254.Barger's method is substantially similar to that of the Maritime
Commission (see Barger, pp. 255-259) .For1939-50, I.C.C. estimates derived from
computations of the U.S. Maritime Commission. For 1951-54. estimates of our own
made by substantially the same methods, employing data from U.S. Army, Board
of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, Waterborne Commerce of the United States,
Washington,1951-54,together with representativedistances from U.S.Navy,
Hydrographic Office, Table of Maritime Distances.The basic data of the Corps
of Engineers present many difficulties of concept, coverage, and overlap.For an
analysis of these difficulties, reference may be made to Wytze Gorter and George
H. Hildebrand, The Pacific Coast Maritime Shipping Industry, 1930-1948, Berkeley,
1952, Vol. I, pp. 71-81.For 1955-57, estimated in 73rd Annual Report of the I.C.C.,
p. 11.
d These data follow the 1952 revision by the Interstate Commerce Commission in
which an effort was made to exclude rural-to-rural movement as well as local and
suburban delivery by truck.See Intercity Ton Miles, 1939-1 952, pp. 1-3, for an ex-
planation of the methods used in estimation.Prior to 1939, taken from Barger,
Transportation Industries, Table F-4, p. 242.Since 1952, from 70th Annual Report
of the I.C.C., p. 43; 73rd Annual Report of the I.C.C., p. 11; 74th Annual Report
of the I.C.C., p. 10; and Intercity Ton Miles, 1939-1959.The surveys on which
estimates of the Bureau of Public Roads are based, from which these estimates are
derived, are discussed in Public Roads (December 1956, pp. 97-98, 102-103), as
are statistical methods for choosing and expanding the samples (ibid., pp. 110-117).
e For 1920, 1926, 1928, 1930, 1932, and 1936-38, from Barger, Transportation
Industries, Table G-1, p. 251.For later years, from the same I.C.C. sources as cited
for motor truck transportation.The estimates by Barger include only pipelines
reporting to the I.C.C., hence are less complete than the data shown for later 'years.
The disparity between Barger's estimate for 1940 and the figure here shown is 15.9
billion ton-miles.
f Not comparable with data for other years.
gInorder to show a total, coastwise and intercoastal traffic has been included





















Source: Table 2, except for railroad freight traffic for 1890-1938, which is
from Barger, Transportation Industries, Table B-i, pp. 184-185. Those early
data have not been adjusted here to include nonrevenue ton-miles, as those in
Table 2 were, but the total freight traffic shown here is nevertheless taken from
Toble 2. The data for 1890-1915 are for years ending June 30, thereafter for
calendar years.
By1940 they handled only 46 per cent of the total. During the war,
however, their share increased rapidly and at the end of the war stood
at nearly 62 per cent. Since that time there has been an almost un-
interrupted decline to a share of less than 40 per cent in the late 1950's.
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CHART2
U.S. Intercity Freight Traffic, SelectedYears, 1890-1959
Total
Railroad
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The rail data employed here are approximately the net ton-miles
of all American railroads, for they include nonrevenue ton-miles of
Class I carriers. In Chapter 2 we shall have occasion to discuss the
proposition that the available Soviet series corresponds most closely
to net ton-miles for U.S. roads. However, the Soviet data are tariff,
rather than actual, ton-kilometers, a difficulty which will also be
discussed in Chapter 2. As there is good reason to believe, from the
analysis in the next chapter, that these tariff ton-kilometers are over-
stated, we have made no adjustment here to place the U.S. data on
short-line distances. While the relationship to reported actual ton-
kilometers is known approximately, the extent of overstatement is not
known for either serieS although it is believed to be large enough to
be of significance. These two differences oppose and at least partially
offset one another—perhaps completely in some years.It is likely,
however, that the Soviet series overstates in most years the ton-kilo-
meters which are properly comparable with the U.S. series.
It is customary to leave coastwise and intercoastal transportation
out of the reckoning in presenting statistics of U.S. transportation.
To do so, however, ignores important traffic flows which are of great
significance to our domestic economy and which compete with other
types of transport; for other resource and movement arrangements
would be essential in the absence of these flows, and a large portion,
at least, would turn up in other forms of transport. The largest single
element of our domestic petroleum transportation is embraced within
these data, for nearly the whole coastwisé tonnage in recent years is
made up by the Gulf-Atlantic petroleum movement. While the hauls
in some of these trades are long by comparison with overland routes,
the principal trades show only a modest degree of circuity, hence no
adjustment has been considered. All the estimates of water transporta-
tion volume are subject to a considerable margin of error since no
ton-mile data are collected and the Corps of Engineers tonnage data
leave much to be desired.25
The data on motor truck transportation are estimated, and the
estimates have gone through several revisions in recent years. They
are designed to show all ton-miles carried by motor vehicles between
cities and also between rural and urban areas. They are designed to
exclude rural-to-rural movements, city deliveries, and city movements
to contiguous suburbs.Estimates by the Bureau of Public Roads
25Thedifficulties with the statistical sources are discussed at length elsewhere
and need not be recounted here.See particularly Gorter and Hildebrand, Pacific
Coast Maritime Shipping, pp. 71-81.
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have been adjusted by the Interstate Commerce Commission in an
effort to secure this desired coverage of "intercity" traffic.26It should
be noted that the Bureau of Public Roads estimate is derived from
information gathered at test points maintained by the Bureau in order
to obtain information on the use made of highways. The representa-
tiveness of these estimates has long been a matter of controversy, but
they are the only available estimates with any substantial underpin-
nings of evidence.It will also be observed that these data exclude
virtually all motor truck movements of the type which occur in the
Soviet Union even though the notion "intercity" sometimes includes
movements between political entities which form parts of a metro-
politan region in an economic sense. The terminal district concept
as administered by the I.C.C. does, however, avoid this difficulty in
many of the large urban areas, even bistate ones.
As pointed Out in the notes to Table 2, the pipeline data for the
years before 1940 are not as inclusive as those after that date.II
should be understood that in both periods the ton-miles are estimates
based upon barrels moved, estimated weights, and estimated lengths
of haul. They are compiled from reports to the I.C.C. of carriers
under Commission regulation and from data developed by the Bureau
of Mines for nonregulated pipelines. They exclude natural gas lines,
but include both crude and products trunk lines and the gathering
line system. The growing importance of this method of transporta-
tion will be obvious.
The data, when presented in this form, indicate the sharp change
in American transportation which has occurred since the 1920's. As
the rail share has declined, the representativeness of rail data has also
declined. Attention should be focused upon the character of traffic
by the various modes of transportation because it has a distinct
bearing upon the extent to which rail transport now reflects the aggre-
gate composition of intercity traffic. Unfortunately, data on the com-
position of truck traffic by commodity and by size of shipment is not
available. In 1926, all the water transportation shown was primarily
bulk carriage of low-grade commodities, with the exception of a
limited tonnage of general cargo handled in the coastwise and inter-
coastal trades and a very small volume of package freight. The pipeline
movement was, of course, bulk. The high-grade traffic moved by truck
was a very minor item.It is not likely that traffic in manufactures
and miscellaneous categories exceeded 30 per cent of total ton-miles
26 These adjustments are described in Intercity Ton 1939-1952, pp. 1 if.
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and virtually all of this moved by rail.27 At the high traffic level of
1953, the situation was in marked contrast to the earlier year. Less-
than-carload traffic originated by rail had declined from some 40
million tons in 1926 to a mere 8,255,000 tons in 1953. Manufactures
and miscellaneous tonnage originated by rail in 1953 was only 14 per
cent higher than in 1926 and its ratio to the total showed very little
change. In the interval, however, truck transportation had built up
from virtually nothing to 217 billion ton-miles and, while nothing
is known directly of the composition of this traffic, what we do know
about the character, organization, and regulatory status of truck
operators leads us to suppose that more than 70 per cent of this traffic
is less-than-carload and manufactures and miscellaneous categories.
Water transportation has remained primarily bulk carriage of raw
materials, fuels, and staples, changes in the general cargo and package
traffic among trades having probably offset one another in large degree.
A growing portion of pipeline traffic has, however, been in refined
products which has brought it into the manufactured category.It
would appear likely, although no satisfactory proof can be afforded,
that the proportion of aggregate ton-miles represented by manu-
factured products, including petroleum, in 1953 was significantly
larger than it had been in 1926 and probably represented between 35
and 40 per cent of the total.
When measurement is changed from ton-miles to revenues, the
significance of the growth of motor transportation becomes more
readily apparent. Revenues of motor common carriers per ton-mile
have consistently been more than three times the average ton-mile
revenues of railroads, reflecting both the higher quality and shorter
average haul of truck freight.2 8 Water and pipeline carriers, of course,
obtain ton-mile revenues substantially lower than those of railroads.
Barger has worked out the freight revenues of the various forms of
transportation for 1939:29
27Railcarloadings were 35.96 per cent in the manufactures and miscellaneous
category to which may be added the less-than-carload tonnage.Ton-miles are
not available by class of traffic, but tons originated in these two categories repre-
sented 28 per cent of total rail tonnage originated, and, as the average haul is
longer for these than for other groups, rail ton-miles in these categories may be
supposed to have exceeded 30 per cent of total rail ton-miles.
28However,average truck hauls for Class I regulated carriers have approximated
200 miles in recent years.
29Barger,Transportation Industries, pp. 15, 128.
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Electric and steam railroads $3,317,000,000




Charles Taff has developed estimates for 1951 and 1955 which cover
passenger and freight transportation combined, but from which we




Steam and electric railroads8,860 8,790
Common and contract truck4,169
Total, intercity truck 12,900
Pipeline (petroleum) 655 846
Water carrier 1,930 2,659
Total 15,614 25,195
Thus it appears that rail freight revenues have declined from 69 per
Cent of the total in 1939 to 56 per cent in 1951. But this is far from
a complete picture, for the truck revenues shown here represent
approximately 37 per cent of the intercity movement covered by our
ton-mile estimates while they include certain local operations excluded
from those data. As Class I motor carriers of property reporting to
the Commission in 1951 already had average ton..mile revenues exceed-
ing five cents, it is reasonable to use a figure of four cents a ton-mile
'for the entire intercity truck traffic.If this is done, we obtain $7,300
million of truck revenues and a total for all transportation of $18,745
million.By 1953 truck revenues should have passed rail freight
revenues and should have accounted for approximately 43 to 46 per
cent of all intercity freight revenues. This situation is emphasized by
Taff's 1955 estimates which attempt to reflect all intercity truck trans-
portation. Upon' this basis, rail freight revenues were less than 35
per cent, of all freight revenues. These value data demonstrate the
extent to which the United States has become dependent upon the
truck for its high-quality transportation—predominantly the movement
small-lot consignments and of finished and semi-finished manufac-
30CharlesA. Taff, Traffic Management: Principles and Practices, rev. ed., Home-
wood,III,,1959, p. a.
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tured items, although the substantial truck movement of perishables
and other agricultural commodities in exempt transportation should
not be forgotten.
Comparisons of Soviet and United States Traffic
To compare Soviet and United States aggregate freight traffic, it is
necessary to convert the data to a common unit of measure. Because
the short ton-mile is a measure more congenial to American ways of
thinking than the metric ton-kilometer, we have converted Soviet data
into short ton-miles. The results are presented in Table S and Chart 3.
TABLE 3











1926 765.8 60.4a 12.7 705.4
1928 762.1 79.6 9.6 682.5
1930 706.2 115.8 6.1 590.4
1932 466.0 144.7 3.2 321.3
1936 721.5 256.7 2.8 464.8
1937 800.6 279.7 2.8 520.9
1938 . 664.7 291.1 2.3 373.6
1939 809.5 310.3 2.6 499.2
1940 894.6 326.2 2.7 568.4
1945 1,189.2 236.4 5.0 952.8
1946 1,173.2 254.1 4.6 919.1
1947 1,267.0 269.6 4.7 997.4
1948 1,296.1 342.2 3.8 953.9
1949 1,160.8 400.4 2.9 760.4
1950 1,324.2 461.6 2.9 862.6
1951 1,454.3 518.3 2.8 936.0
1952 1,409.5 569.0 2.5 840.5
1953 1,495.7 611.1 2.4 884.6
1954 1,415.2 655.5 2.2 759.7
1955 1,579.4 741.1 2.1 838.3
1956 1,648.4 822.6 2.0 826.4
1957 1,617.2 922.6 1.8 694.6
1958 1,500.6 994.8 1.5 501.8
1959 1,586.1 1,093.0 1.5 493.1
SouRcE: Tables 1 and 2.
a For 1925/26.For purposes of this comparison, maritime traffic is assumed to
have been 6 billion ton-kilometers in 1925/26.
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CHART3
Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Total Freight Traffic,
Selected Years, 1890-1959
Source: For U.S., Table 3;
Table 1and converted into
ton-kilometer).
It will appear from Table 3 that while transportation in the United
States more than doubled between its pre-Worid War II peak in 1926
and its peak to date in 1956, Soviet transportation increased twelve
times in the equivalent period. Yet in 1956 the United States was still
transporting more than twice as many ton-miles of freight as the Soviet
Union, without even taking account of the fact that the United States
product is probably understated,31 and the Soviet product overstated,
a matter that will be discussed in the following chapter. During this
period, moreover, U.S. traffic grew by 820.3 billion ton-miles while
Soviet traffic grew only 762.1 billion. Soviet transportation was nearly
30 per cent below the 1940 level in 1945, but by 1954 had attained
slightly more than double the 1940 volume. The United States,
however, which experienced a growth during the war, had by 1953
moved up to 166 per cent of the 1940 level, and then experienced a
81Thisapplies particularly to intercity truck transportation, since it is believed
that a portion of the vehicles escapes Bureau of Public Roads stations under the
misapprehension that they are state weighing stations.It may apply also to certain
elements of water transportation because the ton-miles are estimated from what
are believed to be representative distances which may well understate distances
over the routes of movement, especially where outports are served.
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modest decline. This decline was more than made up for in 1955 and
a further increase occurred in 1956.Since then, the volume has
decreased, although a resumption of traflic growth now appears to be
in progress.
Over the decades covered in Table 3, it was never necessary for
U.S. freight traffic to grow as rapidly as Soviet freight traffic has, except
for the brief acceleration to the wartime peak.It is worth noting,
however, that the American rail plant, without increase of mileage
and with a shrinkage of total available trackage, without significant
increase of its freight car fleet, and with only limited additions to its
motive power, was able to handle by 1944 more than two and a third
times the volume of 1938. With substantially less plant and equipment
than in 1926, the 1944 performance was one and a half times the
previous peak volume of 1926. In no small measure the ability of the
American rail system to accomplish so large an increase in ton-miles
in such a short space of time is the result of the transition from peace-
time to wartime conditions, which makes possible changes in operation
conducive to more intensive utilization. "Normal" Soviet conditions,
as will be observed later, are more akin to wartime than to peacetime
conditions in the United States. But in considerable part the wartime
experience also reflects the fact that the American railway system has,
over the years, carried a good deal of excess capacity in its main running
lines and terminals.
The effect of the depression of the 1930's, reflected in the decline
of U.S. traffic while Soviet traffic continued to grow, is apparent in
Table 3. The rapid wartime expansion in the U.S. and the contem-
poraneous contraction in the USSR resulted in U.S. excesses over
USSR freight volume approaching a trillion ton-miles in each of the
first four postwar years. Only a modest reduction in this excess occurred
until after 1956 when the U.S. experienced a decline in traffic volume.
The brief discussion so far has compared Soviet and American
developments over concurrent periods. This involves comparing growth
in the relatively large American industry with growth in the relatively
small Soviet industry. Rapid rates of growth characterized transporta-
tion in the United States at earlier periods in its history. Since ex-
tensive data are not available for total transportation during those
earlier periods, recourse must be had to railroad data alone as a means
of appraising relative rates of growth. As an approach to these
comparisons, we may recast Soviet railroad ton-kilometers and compute
index numbers using various base years to compare rates of growth
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CHART4
U.S. and Soviet Railroad FreightTraffic, Selected Years, 1890-1959










Source: For Soviet Union, series C-iin Appendix C convertedinto short
ton-miles. For U.S., see Chart 2.
TABLE4
SOVIET RAILWAYS, INDEX NUMBERS, SELECTED 1913-54





1940 632 602 100
1948 679 107 • 100
1950 917 145 135
1952 1,128 179 166
1954 1,304 206 192
SOURCE: Table 1; 1935 from series C-i in Appendix C.
NOTE: It should be observed that moderate territorial expansion, for which we
have been unable to adjust, entered at several points (see Chapter 2).There is
also reason to suppose that the overstatement of ton-kilometers may have increased
as a percentage of the whole, particularly in the 1930's, which would exaggerate
the rate of growth.The evidence is, however, far from conclusive; hence itis
undesirable to make any assumptions on this point.The ton-kilometer series, as
observed above, is not entirely homogeneous because of several changes of concept.
a This is of interest as a base year since it represents the first postwar year in
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with those during various periods in American railroad history
(Table 4; see also Chart 4) .Thus,from the level achieved in 1918
before the revolution, Russian rail freight traffic multiplied thirteen
times over the forty-one years through 1954.Soviet rail traffic first
exceeded U.S. rail volume in that year and it has remained ahead in all
subsequent years. By comparison, United States traffic multiplied 11.4
times from 1882 through 1923; 10.2 times from 1885 through the 1926
peak; five times from 1889 through 1930, which was a year of depressed
traffic; and 3.8 times from 1904 through the all-time peak of 1945. Data
for all United States railroads are not available before 1882.
Comparisons of the Soviet 1926-40 experience may be made with
traffic growth in ton-miles on United States railroads at five-year
intervals for various periods of rapid growth as follows:82
U.S.
Soviet 1890 1893 1894 1895 1898 1903
1925/26 BaseBase Base Base Base Base Base
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
194 112 122 154 166 152 126
375 186 185 217 219 191 174
602 245 233 272 299 264 236
Thus it appears that the most rapid growth over a fifteen-year period
in the recorded history of American railroads was from 1895 to 1910
when the volume nearly tripled.33However, it appears from the
Babson estimates of ton-miles, which antedate the Interstate Commerce
Commission statistics, that in the period 1877-81 American railroad
ton-miles more than doubled in the space of four years.34 Between
1885 and 1888 the increase was by approximately one-half.Both
of these pe;riods represent increases from the low points of depressions
and both were accompanied by a rapid increase of line mileage—indeed
they were two of the most vigorous periods of railroad building and
of westward expansion in American railway history. The rates then
achieved were not sustained over long periods. Nor can the Babson
estimates be meshed with the I.C.C. figures to enable us to span the
periods before and after 1889 with confidence. However, it may be
observed that the growth beween 1890 and 1920 was not quite sixfold.
After 1918 growth was at a considerably slower rate than in the period
from 1890 up to that year.
32AllU.S. data for the period before 1940 are for Class I, II, and III railroads,
revenue ton-miles only, as reported by the I.C.C.
33TheInterstate Commerce Commission statistics begin with the year 1889.
34SeeThor Hultgren, American Transportation in Prosperity and Depression,
New York, NBER, 1948, p. 24.
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Soviet postwar traffic growth, since the re-establishment of the
prewar level, has been slower than during the prewar period. It has
had no parallel in recent American history, for either rail alone or
transportation of all types (Table 5). Hence some indexes of railroad
TABLE 5


















1940 100 100 100
1948 107 100 167 100 145 100
















a 1954 was a year of depressed truck and rail traffic.For 1955, the ratio on the
1948 base was 118, while for 1953 it stood at 114.
growth at earlier periods of U.S. history are also offered at two-year
intervals for comparison with the span in Soviet development from
1948 to 1954 (Table 6). Again it is necessary to return to the period
before 1889 to find growth rates in short periods on American railroads
which duplicate the Soviet postwar period.
TABLE 6
SovIET POSTWAR GROWTH OF RAIL TRAFFIC


























SOURCE: Table 4and footnote 32.
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As will be elaborated in later chapters, the Soviet growth is a real
one, even though our indexes may overstate it to some degree.It
represents, moreover, a very solid accomplishment. Except for a brief
period in the middle 1930's, no substantial evidence has come to light
which suggests that Soviet transportation inadequacies have in any
material way limited the growth of other segments of the economy,
although it is clear that Soviet industry labors under the burden of
adjusting its operations to limited transportation capacity in ways
unknown in the Western world. Four decades of intensive develop-
ment of a limited rail network with a highly intensive use of the
physical plant appear not to have diminished the capabilities of
transport in relation to the economy as a whole. The period has been
one of struggle to keep abreast of traffic, however. There has not been
significant concentration on service improvement. The emphasis now
appears to be shifting toward modernization of plant and equipment
which, however, Soviet writers concede will be a slow process as theirs
is a rapidly expanding railroad economy. That there are but limited
reserves in the transportation system is very probably correct, yet if
this should also be true of the Soviet manufacturing industry, then
the risk may be a limited one.Nevertheless, the recent literature
suggests growing concern lest the postwar transportation expansion
not keep pace with the demands of the economy and lest this failure
again obstruct growth in other sectors. Hence the emphasis is on
further expansion, but with an economy of investment to be made
possible by large.scale electrification and dieselization.
The rationale behind such proposals as embraced in the Sixth Five
Year Plan was made clear by Blackman in his study of locomotive
technology,35 and the same policies appear to be reflected in the
current Seven Year Plan for the years to 1965. Essentially they repre-
sent a logical continuance of earlier policy for, by shifting to diesel
power, it will be possible to handle heavier trainloads at greater speeds
over existing lines, thus increasing the output of which these lines
are capable. Although passing sidings and receiving and departure
yard trackage may require lengthening, the light axle loadings of
diesel power will avoid the necessity for large-scale replacement of
rail with heavier section as well as the necessity for extensive bridge
strengthening or replacement. Both these types of rebuilding would
be required were more intensive working sought through the use of
heavier steam power. Hence although the Soviet calculations promise
35 James H. Blackman, TransportDevelopmentand Locomotive Technology in
the Soviet Union, Columbia, S. C., 1957.
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operating economies analogous to those realized in this country, pri-
mary interest appears to be focused on the saving in capital investment
associated with a given increase in capacity. This gives dieselization
a dimension which was rarely of significance in the
36Differencein the quality of transport output might, of course, be reflected by
comparisons in value terms rather than in ton-miles.Since the Soviet output is
virtually all performed by rail, water, and pipeline transport, and since the prin-
cipal change over the years has been the increase in the rail share to nearly 90
per cent, a properly constructed index of values ought to show a growth not very
different from that in ton-miles.In the United States, despite great changes in the
participationof varioustypes oftransport,the discrepancy between output
measured in value and that measured in ton-miles appears to be less than might
be expected.For while the 1955 volume was slightly over twice the 1929 volume,
estimated freight revenues were less than two and a half times the 1929 level.
Yet U.S. performance compared with USSR performance would probably appear
somewhat stronger in value terms than in tons or ton-miles, as used here.
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